Sex on the Internet: A Legal Click or an Illicit Trick? by Green, Matthew
California Western Law Review 
Volume 38 Number 2 Article 9 
2002 
Sex on the Internet: A Legal Click or an Illicit Trick? 
Matthew Green 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr 
Recommended Citation 
Green, Matthew (2002) "Sex on the Internet: A Legal Click or an Illicit Trick?," California Western Law 
Review: Vol. 38 : No. 2 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol38/iss2/9 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in California Western Law Review by an authorized editor of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu. 
SEX ON THE INTERNET: A LEGAL CLICK OR
AN ILLICIT TRICK?
Matthew Green'
INTRODUCTION
Due to the influx of reality-based television shows and voyeuristic Web
sites that utilize live Web cameras, t incidents of Internet users paying to
watch cybersex and other sexually titillating activities is at an all-time high.
Because of the accessibility of such Web sites to minors, coupled with
community morals, several localities are searching for ways to protect mi-
nors by eliminating cyberpomography.2 In an effort to curb these adult-
oriented Internet activities, district attorneys could potentially prosecute Web
site owners, Web users, and Internet performers under pandering,3 pimping,4
and prostitution laws.'
.J.D. Candidate, April 2003, California Western School of Law; B.A., Political Science,
University of California, at San Diego, 2000. 1 would like to thank both Prof. Robert
DeKoven and Dr. Frank Miskiel for their assistance.
1. Francesca Ortiz, Zoning the Voyeur Dorm: Regulating Home-Based Voyeur Web Sites
Through Land Use Laws, 34 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 929, 930-31 (2001) (discussing the dramatic
increase of reality-based television shows and exhibitionist Web sites, such as Voyeur-
Dornicom).
2. In order to protect minors from harmful material, Congress has repeatedly enacted leg-
islation, such as the "Communications Decency Act of 1996," which was struck down in vio-
lation of the First Amendment. See generally Reno v. ACLU (Reno 11), 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
In response to the ruling, Congress then enacted the "Children Online Protection Act of
1998," which was also found to violate the First Amendment. See generally ACLU v. Reno
(Reno IM, 217 F.3d 162 (3rd Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 532 U.S.
1037 (2001) (striking down the "Children Online Protection Act" due to the technological dif-
ficulties with preventing a Web page from being viewed in a particular locality, such that the
"community standards" test for obscenity would "require every Web communication to abide
by the most restrictive community's standards"). See also Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 220
F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'd sub. nom. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, No. 00-795,
2002 WL 552476, at *2 (U.S. Apr 16, 2002) (holding the "Child Pornography Prevention Act
of 1996," which banned "virtual" child pornography, including computer-generated images
appearing to be children and sexual acts with persons portrayed to be minors, was overbroad
and infringed upon protected speech under the First Amendment).
3. Pandering is the act of "persuading or encouraging" another to become a prostitute.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 266(i) (West 1999).
4. Pimping occurs when one "lives or deriv[es] support" from a prostitute's "earnings."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 266(h) (West 1999).
5. Prostitution is "any lewd act between persons for money or other consideration." CAL
PENAL CODE § 647(b) (West 1999).
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This Comment will address the issue of whether a Web user that pro-
vides consideration for access to a pornographic Web site and subsequently
views a live-sex show, or engages in directing an Internet actor to mastur-
bate, should be prosecuted for prostitution. Part I provides a discussion of
the large, almost mainstream adult entertainment industry that exists today.
Part II explains the history of prostitution regulation and its justifications in
the Twentieth Century. Part III specifically addresses the application of Cali-
fornia's prostitution statutes to the Internet. Finally, Part IV analyzes the
First Amendment's protection of such adult Web sites and the adult enter-
tainment industry.
There are two scenarios occurring on the Internet that will be discussed.
The first is the situation where the Web user pays a fee to direct a Web per-
former to masturbate. California case law suggests that physical contact be-
tween the customer and the actor is probably required for a prostitution con-
viction,6 although it is not clear whether physical contact must occur. The
second scenario is that of a Web user paying for access to a Web site to view
a live sex-show that does involve physical contact between the actors them-
selves. In California, the hiring of actors to engage in "nonobscene" sexual
activities for a film does not constitute prostitution.7 In Arizona, however,
which has a similar prostitution statute to that of California, the "semi-
private performance" of women engaging in sexual activities behind a glass
window for money in the presence of the customer has been held to be pros-
titution.8
It is unclear whether the Internet performances constitute protected
nonobscene pornographic films or unprotected live sex shows. As a result,
the answer likely lies behind the public policy that justifies the criminaliza-
tion of prostitution. Because the traditional policy underlying prostitution
statutes is not applicable to the Internet,9 the live Internet sex shows do not
constitute prostitution, and should be protected under the First Amendment.
6. See People v. Fitzgerald, 165 Cal. Rptr. 271, 272 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1979)
(holding that California's prostitution statute disallows "sexually motivated acts," which re-
quire a physical "touching") and People v. Hill, 163 Cal. Rptr. 99, 105 (Ct. App. 1980) (con-
cluding that "bodily contact between the prostitute and the customer is required"). But see
People v. Janini, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 248, 251 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating that the city attor-
ney's claim that "skin-to-skin contact" is not required is "debatable, to say the least").
7. People v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128, 1129 (Cal. 1988).
8. State v. Taylor, 808 P.2d 314, 318 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
9. The lack of physical contact expels traditional prostitution concerns, such as the
spread of sexually transmitted diseases, rape, and the safety of the prostitutes. See Common-
wealth v. Dodge, 429 A.2d 1143, 1149 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (holding that there is a "valid
state interest" in prohibiting prostitution because "[p]rostitution is an important source of ve-
nereal disease"); and Susan E. Thompson, Note, Prostitution-A Choice Ignored, 21
WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 217, 240 (2000) (citing Priscilla Alexander, Prostitution: A Difficult
Issue for Feminists, SEX WORK: WRITINGs By WOMEN tN THE SEX INDUSTRY 184, 201
(Frederique Delacoste & Priscilla Alexander eds., 1987)).
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I. TODAY'S ADULT ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY: THRIVING AND GROWING
According to Frank Rich, pornography is "no longer a sideshow to the
mainstream ... it is the mainstream," such that the adult entertainment in-
dustry produces between $10 billion and $14 billion in revenues per year in
America alone) Many consider this estimate to be inflated, suggesting that
the industry actually produces somewhere between $2 billion and $4 bil-
lion." Nonetheless, the adult industry produces over $56 billion worldwide 12
and is expected to triple over the next five to seven years.'
3
The migration of adult entertainment into mainstream America is the re-
sult of several factors. Beginning in the 1980s with the advent of the Video
Cassette Recorder (VCR), adult movies became much more appealing, be-
cause they could be viewed in the privacy of the homes as opposed to the
very public, potentially humiliating, neighborhood XXX theater. 4 While
only 1,275 pornographic videos were released in 1990, that number in-
creased to 8,948 videos in 1998.15 In that same year, Americans rented over
686 million adult videos.' 6 Furthermore, due to the fact that one can simply
order adult-oriented programming through his or her cable company on pay-
per-view, one does not even need to leave his or her home to rent porno-
graphic movies. Several adult channels, including The Playboy Channel, The
Spice Channel, and The Hot Network, are readily available through multiple
cable providers from mainstream companies, including General Motors' Di-
rectTV, Time Warner Cable, AT&T Broadband, Cox Communications,
Comcast Corporation, Cablevision Systems, Charter Communications, Me-
diaOne, Insight Communications, GTE, SNET, U S WEST, and Echo Star's
The Dish Network. 7 Due to the lucrative nature of adult pay-per-view ser-
vices, these mainstream companies have a large incentive to offer these adult
10. Frank Rich, Naked Capitalists: There's No Business Like Porn Business, N.Y. TtEs
MAGAZNE (May 20, 2001), at http://205.182.50.1l6Articles/BLHG_Ncw_..York_
Times_05202001article.htm. See also Davide Dukcevich, Stock Focus: Adult Entertainment
Companies, FORBS.COM (May 23, 2001), at http:lwww.forbes.com/2001/05/23/0523sf.htnl
(where Robert Routh, an analyst from Ladenburg Thalmann stated that adult cntertainment
sales in the U.S. are over $11 billion).
11. See David Ackman, How Big is Porn? FoRBEs.coM (May 25, 2001). at
http'/www.forbes.com/ 2001/05/25/0524porn.html%20 (dismissing the $10 billion figure and
replacing it with the $4 billion estimate published in ADULT VIDEO NEws, an adult industry
trade paper, which was obtained from a study conducted by Adams Media Research, Forrester
Research, Veronis Suhler Communications Industry Report, and IVD). These studies found
that Americans pay between $2.6 billion and $3.9 billion for adult-oriented materials. Id.
12. Robert C. Morals, Porn Goes Public, FORBES.COM (June 14, 1999). at
http'//www.forbes.comlforbesl1999/06146312214a.html%20.
13. Dukcevich, supra note 10 (as stated by Robert Routh).
14. See Morals, supra note 12 (identifying technology, including the VCR and the Inter-
net, as the main contributors to the growth of the adult entertainment industry).
15. I.
16. Id.
17. See Letter from Daniel E. Somers, President & CEO, AT&T Broadband to Lynn
Langmade (Aug. 3, 2000), at http://www.spiderwomen.org/campaigns/att/ait-Itrtosw.htn
3
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networks. Cable operators are entitled to approximately eighty percent of the
profit, while the network receives only twenty percent of the gross revenue. 
18
Although pay-per-view generates $128 million per year in the U.S., that
figure pales in comparison to the revenues from pornography on the Internet,
which are estimated at approximately $1 billion in the U.S. alone. 9 Accord-
ing to Net Ratings, an Internet research company, 22.9 million Web users
visited adult Web sites in April 2001 alone.2" As stated by Alvin Cooper of
Stanford University, "Sex is an integral part of the Internet," such that nine
million individuals "log on daily for sexual pursuits."21
One popular Web site, which has a market value of over $158 million,22
is the publicly traded Private Media Group.23 In addition to the plethora of
pictures and adult videos available on the Internet, one of the many Web
sites owned by the Private Media Group, Privatelive.com, as well as several
of its competitors, also offers live sex shows and interactive masturbation
performances to its subscribers for a monthly fee or by the minute.' This
type of live video streaming is dubbed as "the hottest ticket item among the
pornicopia of online products available."
25
Because Web users provide compensation for these types of sexual ac-
tivities, district attorneys could potentially target Web site owners and Inter-
net performers for prosecution under pandering, pimping, and prostitution
laws, while Web site subscribers, who purchase this type of service, may be
prosecuted under solicitation statutes.26 Several of the forty-nine states that
18. Morals, supra note 12.
19. See id. (as stated by Forrester Research); and Ackman, supra note 11 (according to
Adams Media Research, Forrester Research, Veronis Suhler Communications Industry Re-
port, and IVD).
20. Ackman, supra note 1I.
21. Raymond McCaffrey, Sex Sells: Millions Engage in Cybersex, THE COLO. SPRINGS
GAZETTE TELEGRAPH, Mar. 30, 1999, at Al.
22. Dukcevich, supra note 10 (as of May 22, 2001, according to Market Guide and FT
Interactive Data via FactSet Research Systems).
23. This Spanish company is traded on the NASDAQ, under the ticker symbol "PRVT."
24. See Morals, supra note 12 (describing adult activities that are commonplace on the
Internet).
25. Ron Russell, On the Internet, Where Porn Means Mega-Profits, L.A. 's Cybermis-
tresses are in the Vanguard of a Boom Industry, NEw TIMES Los ANGELES (Sep. 17, 1998), at
http://www.newtimesla.con/issues/1998-09-17/feature.html/pagel.html.
26. See James Nahikian, Comment, Learning to Love "The Ultimate Peripheral"--
Virtual Vices Like "Cyberprostitution" Suggest a New Paradigm to Regulate Online Expres-
sion, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 779, 802 (1996) (identifying the notion of
"cyberprostitution," but concluding that prostitution unequivocally requires "direct genital
contact"); Cf. David Cardiff, Note, Virtual Prostitution: New Technologies and the World's
Oldest Profession, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 869, 889 (1996) (also discussing the idea
of "virtual prostitution," but concluding that prostitution statutes are applicable because "indi-
viduals who hire actors and actresses to engage in filmed or photographed sex acts for com-
mercial reproduction can be prosecuted under state pimping, pandering, and prostitution stat-
utes," an idea supported by People ex rel. Van De Kamp v. American Art Enters., Inc., 142
Cal. Rptr. 338 (Ct. App. 1977), a case that is no longer good law, as it was later disapproved
in People v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128, 1133 (Cal. 1988).
[Vol. 38
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currently outlaw prostitution2 7 provide very broad language in their prostitu-
tion statutes, where physical contact is not an element of the crime. For ex-
ample, California's disorderly conduct statute describes "prostitution" as
"any lewd act between persons for money or other consideration. ' In Ari-
zona, prostitution also occurs when a customer pays another to engage in
sexual activities with a third person while the customer only views the sex-
ual acts.29 Prostitution statues vary by state, and evolve with community so-
cial mores.
H. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF PROSTITUTION IN AMERICA
During much of the Nineteenth Century, men and women were free to
engage in sexual activities, which today would constitute prostitution, in
most American cities with minimal fear of any legal repercussions.' As the
Nineteenth Century drew to a close, several cities, in an attempt to cater to
moral concerns of the era, confined brothels to the "red light districts." 3' Un-
der a state's police power, which includes the power to regulate "public
morals," states and localities began to exercise their ability to regulate prosti-
tution.32
In addition to forcing prostitutes into the "red light" districts, many mu-
nicipalities attempted to institute various registration schemes, requiring
prostitutes to identify themselves to the police.33 Most cities, however, im-
plemented its police power to criminalize prostitution.' For example, in
1912, New York City was home to over 142 brothels; but by 1917, after
criminalizing prostitution, only three continued to exist. 35 The federal gov-
27. Angie Wagner, Brothels in Nevada Keep a Low Profile, THE COLUMBIAN, July 15,
2001 at A12. In Nevada, ten of the seventeen counties permit prostitution. Id.
28. CAL PENAL CODE § 647(b) (West 1999).
29. State v. Taylor, 808 P.2d 314, 315 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the "perform-
ance of sexual acts upon each other for the gratification of customers who pay to watch" con-
stitutes prostitution where customers paid female performers to engage in breast fondling and
cunnilingus in a small booth behind a clear glass window).
30. See Thompson, supra note 9, at 223-24 (citing V. BULLOUGH & B. BuuLoucat,
WOMEN AND PROSTITIMON: A SOCIAL HISTORY 226 (1987), noting that prostitution was a
publicly accepted practice, such that several cities published "official guidebooks" describing
the women of local brothels).
31. Id at 224 (explaining that the term "red light district" "derived 'from the practice of
trainmen leaving their signal lanterns in front of a house or shack while a making a visit
there"') (quoting V. BULLOUGH & B. BULLOUGH, WOMN AND PROsTrrUnON: A SOCIAL
HISTORY 224 (1987)).
32. See People ex rel. Thrasher v. Smith, 114 N.E. 31, 32 (Ill. 1916) (ruling that a state's
ability to restrict prostitution is "an exercise of the police power of the state, passed in the in-
terest of the public welfare, for the preservation of good order and public morals").
33. Thompson, supra note 9, at 225 (citing V. BULLOUGH & B. BULLOUGHI. WOMEN AND
PROSTrruTnON: A SOCIAL HISTORY 225 (1987)).
34. Id
35. Id. at 225 (citing V. BULLOUGH & B. BULLOUGH, WOMEN AND PROSTrrtmo,: A
SOcLL HISTORY 228 (1987)).
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eminent also instituted moral statutes about the same time. Utilizing the fed-
eral power to regulate interstate commerce, Congress passed the Mann Act
of 1910, which imposes criminal sanctions against any person that "trans-
ports individuals in interstate or foreign commerce" for the purpose of en-
gaging in sexual acts constituting prostitution.36
The practice of prostitution became illegal in the Twentieth Century as a
result of several public policy concerns. First, fornication violates widely
held Judeo-Christian morality, and prostitution statutes attempted to sup-
press this activity.37 Second, societal morality stigmatizes the image of
women roaming the streets selling sex, in plain view of the general public,
and the statutes were intended to dissuade this practice.38 Third, prostitution
statutes were instituted to combat the spread of sexually transmitted diseases
(STDs) and to protect the health and safety of the community.3 9 Fourth, the
criminalization of prostitution was seen as a mechanism to protect the prosti-
tute from being a perpetual victim of violent crimes, including rape, assault,
battery, and robbery.4 Fifth, the statutes were seen as a way to eliminate col-
lateral crime, as prostitution allegedly attracts other forms of criminal behav-
ior, such as drug use, drug dealing, organized crime, and unscrupulous police
behavior.4" Finally, it was believed that prosecuting prostitutes could reduce
the number of prostitutes on the street, and subsequently could diminish the
number of children who are victims of commercial sexual exploitation.4"
Currently, it is estimated that there are anywhere between a quarter million
36. Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (West 2000). See United States v. Roeder, 526 F.2d
736, 739 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding that transporting women across state lines for the purpose
of making a pornographic film violated the Mann Act).
37. Thompson, supra note 9, at 229 (citing JOHN F. DECKER, PROSTITUTION:
REGULATION AND CONTROL 39 (1979)).
38. Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 523,
529 (2000) (stating that "streetwalkers are the most visible and familiar .... comprise only ten
to twenty percent of all prostitutes, [but] ... account for eighty-five to ninety percent of all
prostitution arrests").
39. See Commonwealth v. Dodge, 429 A.2d 1143, 1147, 1149-50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)
(holding that there is a "valid state interest" in prohibiting prostitution because "[pirostitution
is an important source of venereal disease").
40. Thompson, supra note 9, at 240 (citing Priscilla Alexander, Prostitution: A Difficult
Issue for Feminists, in SEX WORK: WRITINGS BY WOMEN IN THE SEX INDUSTRY 184, 201
(Frederique Delacoste & Priscilla Alexander eds., 1987)).
41. Thompson, supra note 9, at 240 (citing Jessica N. Drexler, Government's Role in
Turning Tricks: The World's Oldest Profession in The Netherlands and United States, 15
DICK. J. INT'L L. 201, 208 (1996)).
42. Richard J. Estes, Ph.D. & Neil Alan Weiner, Ph.D., The Commercial Sexual Exploi-
tation of Children in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, at
http://caster.ssw.upenn.edu/-restes/CSECFiles/Complete CSEC_020220.pdf (Sept. 10,
2001) (finding, in their study, that adult prostitution zones allow children to be commercially,
sexually exploited because these "markets" exist in low-income areas with cheap motels, ar-
eas prevalent with drug use and minors). See also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and
Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13, 28 n. 60 (1993) (stating that "fourteen is the average
age of a woman's entry into prostitution").
[Vol. 38
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and 1.3 million prostitutes that serve over 1.5 million customers each week.13
Although large, these numbers are dwarfed by the many millions of Web us-
ers that daily surf the Web in search of cyber sex.
mn1. APPLICATION OF PROSTITUTION STATUTES TO THE INTERNET
It is yet to be decided whether a person that provides consideration to
gain access to an adult Web site and subsequently views a live-sex show, or
directs an Internet performer to masturbate, is engaging in criminal behavior.
The types of criminal acts that could potentially be applied to the paying
Web user include prostitution, solicitation of prostitution, pimping, pander-
ing, placing or permitting placement of wife in a house of prostitution,"
keeping or residing in a house used for prostitution, 5 and leasing an apart-
ment with the knowledge that it will be used for prostitution.'
A. Prostitution and Solicitation
In California, the Penal Code defines prostitution as "any lewd act be-
tween persons for money or other consideration."47 In order to be prose-
cuted, one must either solicit, or offer, another to "engage" in prostitution, or
accept an offer to participate in acts of prostitution.' Secondly, there must
be "some act" taken in "furtherance of the commission" of prostitution. 9 Fi-
nally, only one of the parties needs "specific intent," and therefore either the
offeror's or offeree's intent satisfies the requisite intent for all involved par-
ties.5" Even with close scrutiny of California's prostitution statute and its in-
terpretation by the courts, it remains ambiguous as to whether the statute re-
quires actual, physical contact.
California's prostitution statute fails to provide a definition of "lewd
acts." Other states, including Missouri, include definitions in the prostitution
statute requiring bodily contact." Similar to California, Missouri's statute
describes prostitution as occurring when one "engages or offers or agrees to
engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for something of
value to be received by the person or by a third person."' To eliminate any
ambiguity, however, the Missouri statute identifies "sexual conduct" as "any
43. Thompson, supra note 9, at 225 (citing DEBORAH L RIIODE, JUSTICE AND GEsDER:
SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 257 (1989)).
44. CAL. PENAL CODE § 266(g) (West 1999).
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 315 (West 1999).
46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 316 (West 1999).
47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(b) (West 1999).
48. Id
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 567.020 (West 1999).
52. Id. § 567.020(2) (as applied in State v. Burgess, 669 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Mo. App.
E.D. 1984)).
7
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touching, manual or otherwise, of the anus or genitals of one person by an-
other, done for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of either
party. 53 As a result, it is clear that Missouri's prostitution offense specifi-
cally requires physical contact. The absence of the touching element would
therefore excuse the Web site user from criminal liability. However, Internet
actors engaging in intercourse, oral copulation, or other sexual conduct, still
may be liable for prostitution.
Most individuals commonly believe that prostitution consists of sexual
intercourse in exchange for money. Because of the broad language in Cali-
fornia's statute, however, acts not constituting intercourse do qualify as
criminal behavior, and actual sexual intercourse is "not required to be guilty
of an act of prostitution."54 In order to appreciate what acts constitute prosti-
tution, one must examine the California courts' interpretations of "lewd
acts."
As defined by the California Supreme Court, the term "lewd conduct,"
as used in Section 647(a) of the California Penal Code, involves "the touch-
ing of the genitals, buttocks, or female breast for the purpose of sexual
arousal, gratification, annoyance or offense., 55 Section 647(a)'s definition
was later applied to Section 647(b) of the California Penal Code.56 In Hill,
the court held that a "lewd act" constitutes prostitution if "the genitals, but-
tocks, or female breast, of either the prostitute or the customer... come into
contact with some part of the body of the other for the purpose of sexual
arousal or gratification of the customer or of the prostitute." 57 Thus, Hill
suggests a touching is required.
Therefore, although one might argue that the California prostitution
statute is vague, it would appear that a prostitution conviction without some
bodily contact would be prohibited. Further, Pryor specifically holds that,
under California's prostitution statute, "sexually motivated acts" require a
physical "touching" for prosecution.5" Moreover, according to California's
standard jury instructions for prostitution, a "lewd act" refers to "any act
which involves the touching of the genitals, buttocks, or female breast of one
person by any part of the body of another person and is done with the intent
53. Id. § 567.020(4)(c) (emphasis added).
54. People v. Dell, 283 Cal. Rptr. 361, 371 (Ct. App. 1991) (affirming a prostitution con-
viction where undercover police officers investigated an escort service for suspected prostitu-
tion).
55. Pryor v. Municipal Court, 599 P.2d 636, 647 (Cal. 1979) (where the court defined
"lewd" and "dissolute," as used in CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(a), in upholding a lower court's
conviction for solicitation of a "lewd or dissolute" act when the defendant attempted to solicit
another to engage in oral sex in a public place). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(a) (West
1999) (making it crime to "solicit anyone to engage in or who engages in lewd or dissolute
conduct in any public place or in any place open to the public exposed to public view").
56. See People v. Hill, 163 Cal. Rptr. 99, 105 (Ct. App. 1980).
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Id. See also People v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128, 1130 (Cal. 1988) (upholding the
definition used in both Pryor and Hill).
534 [Vol. 38
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to sexually arouse or gratify."" Additionally, in October 2001, a California
Court of Appeal held that "without sexual contact, there can be no prostitu-
tion."6
Although the lack of physical contact between the "cyberprostitute"'I
and the customer might allow the Web user to escape criminal sanctions, the
Internet performers, who engage in masturbation, intercourse, oral copula-
tion, and other sexual acts, still might be criminally liable for prostitution.
According to both Pryor and Hill, the "touching of the genitals, buttocks, or
female breast" is essential in a prostitution conviction.62 As a result, the
physical touching between the live sex performers for "the purpose of sexual
arousal or gratification," coupled with the "money or other consideration"
that the performer receives from the Web user, may in fact qualify as prosti-
tution.63 Moreover, it does not matter who actually compensates the prosti-
tute, whether it is the Web user or the prostitute's employer.'
To support the idea that the viewing of others engaging in sexual activi-
ties constitutes criminal behavior, a California Court of Appeal held that the
acts of breast fondling, cunnilingus, 5 and fellatio" performed on stage be-
tween a paying member of the audience and a stripper constituted acts of
prostitution.' While this case dealt with sexual relations between a paying
customer and the performer, the California Supreme Court has not ruled on
whether lewd acts between the performers themselves for consideration con-
stitute prostitution.6 8 In order to address the scenario that occurs when a Web
user views live sex performances on the Internet, one must seek persuasive
authority from other states, such as Arizona.
59. See CAIAIC No. 16.420 (as used in People v. Janini. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 252-53
(Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis added).
60. Wooten v. Superior Court, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 195, 203 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
prostitution requires physical contact between the prostitute and the customer where under-
cover officers viewed women in a private booth engaging in sexual activities with one an-
other).
61. See Nahikian, supra note 26, at 781.
62. People v. Hill, 163 Cal. Rptr. 99, 105 (CL App. 1980).
63. See id.
64. See People v. Fixler, 128 Cal. Rptr 363, 365 (Ct. App. 1976) (holding that "it seems
self-evident that if A pays B to engage in sexual intercourse with C, then B is engaging in
prostitution and that situation is not changed by the fact that A may stand by to observe the
act or photograph it").
65. Cunnilingus is "a sexual activity involving oral contact with the female genitals.
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 338 (3d college ed. 1988).
66. Fellatio is "a sexual activity involving oral contact with the penis." WEBSTER's NEW
WoRLD DiCrIONARY 498 (3d college ed. 1988).
67. People v. Maita, 203 Cal. Rptr. 685, 688 (Cal CE. App. 1984) (where the Court of
Appeal upheld pimping and pandering convictions of the club owner and stated "that the en-
tertainer cannot have sexual relations with the audience").
68. A recent California Court of Appeal ruling issued on Oct. 30, 2001 was the first Cali-
fornia case to address this scenario. See Wooten v. Superior Court, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 195,203
(Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that prostitution requires physical contact between the prostitute
and the customer).
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The Arizona Supreme Court held that persons "perform[ing] sexual acts
upon each other for the gratification of customers who pay to watch" consti-
tutes prostitution.69 In Taylor, an adult club contained a "closet-sized" room
where its patrons could pay to view through a glass window a woman mas-
turbating or multiple women participating in sexual activities on a bed." The
club also permitted customers to masturbate, while the women often per-
formed cunnilingus and fondled each other's breasts.7'
Similar to the vagueness of California's prostitution statute, Arizona's
relevant statute defines prostitution as "engaging in or agreeing or offering to
engage in sexual conduct with another person under a fee arrangement with
that person or any other person. '72 "Sexual contact, sexual intercourse, oral
sexual contact or sadomasochistic abuse" qualifies as "sexual conduct.""
"Sexual contact" is "any direct or indirect fondling or manipulating of any
part of the genitals, anus or female breasts. 74 Despite the fact that the cus-
tomer is passively participating in a voyeuristic experience, the Arizona stat-
ute does not require contact between the client and the prostitute. As a result,
the act of a customer paying a woman to engage in sexual acts in a motel
room with another individual, or in booths separated by glass windows,
qualifies as prostitution.75
In discussing its rationale, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed the
California court's ruling in Freeman.76 In Freeman, a pornographic movie
producer hired actors to engage in "nonobscene" sexual activities for a
film.77 Because the movie producer did not compensate the actors to perform
sexual acts for his own or his actors' "sexual gratification," and the paid ac-
tors "were separated from consumers by time and the distancing medium of
film," the actors were deemed not to be "prostitutes."78 In Taylor, however,
there was no distance in time between the customer and the actors, such that
there was a live performance.79 In its upholding of the prostitution convic-
tions, the Arizona court held that the performances in the booths were not
69. State v. Taylor, 808 P.2d 314, 315 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
70. Id. The club charged $20 per woman. Id.
71. Id. at 316. Patrons were usually encouraged to masturbate in order to show they were
not police officers. Id.
72. Id. (citing ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-3211(5) (1989)). One notable distinction regarding
Arizona's prostitution statute is the inclusion of the phrase "or any other person," which ad-
dresses physical contact between the prostitute and any third persons. See Wooten, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 204.
73. Taylor, 808 P.2d at 316 (citing ARiz. R V. STAT. § 13-3211(8) (1989)).
74. Id. (citing ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-3211(9) (1989)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 317 (discussing the court's rationale in Freeman).
77. People v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128, 1129 (Cal. 1988).
78. Taylor, 808 P.2d at 317.
79. Id.
[Vol. 38
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"public," but rather consisted of "a semi-private performance with an explic-
itly masturbatory end.""
Because California's prostitution statute is similar to that of Arizona, it
is conceivable that California courts could convict Web performers that re-
ceive compensation to engage in sexual activity in order to fulfill a Web us-
ers' voyeuristic desires of prostitution. However, a significant distinction ex-
ists between Web users and the customers in the Arizona Taylor case. In
Taylor, the customer was within close physical proximity to the prostitutes.
In cyberspace, although the sexual performers may be giving live, "semi-
private"'" presentations like those in Taylor, there is potentially a great dis-
tance separating the customer from the prostitute. Moreover, like the films in
Freeman, the customer is viewing the sexual acts through the lens of a Web
camera. As a result of the difficulties with defining the Internet medium it-
self, the uncertainty escalates. A court could reasonably rule that the live
Web performances are identical to either the live sex shows in Taylor or the
adult films in Freeman.
The vague and ambiguous language of prostitution statutes only exacer-
bates the uncertainty. For example, Web sites, such as VoyeurDorm.com,
have implemented a "no sex on camera" policy to reduce the risk of criminal
liability. 82 As a result of the ambiguity, the resolution of the issue will likely
turn on a discussion of public policy, and attempts could be made to invoke
local social morals or community standards in order to control activities on
the global World Wide Web.
Opponents of cyber pornography would encourage criminal liability.
They would probably view prostitution convictions of Web users and Inter-
net performers as a means to reduce the exposure of indecent adult materials
to susceptible minors that may have access to these types of services,83 di-
minish the potential for these "cyberprostitutes"' to be victimized by their
pimps, and decrease the amount of immoral behavior on the Internet.8 They
would adopt a very paternalistic view of the Internet and restrict "the adult
population ... to [viewing] only what if fit for children."' 6
Proponents of self-determination and individual liberty would view the
Internet more pragmatically. They would see these types of web sites as pro-
viding entrepreneurial opportunities to women, many of whom have been
80. Id. at 318.
81. Id. The "semi-private" performance that occurred in the booths in Taylor is similar to
live performances via the Internet.
82. Ortiz, supra note 1, at 934 (quoting Joel Deane, Cyberporn King's Latest Headline
Grabber, ZDNet News from ZDWire, Oct. 30 1998, where Bruce Hammil. a co-founder of
VoyeurDorm.com, stated that his Web site contains "nudity, but no planned sex").
83. See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (recognizing that
"there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of mi-
nors").
84. See Nahikian, supra note 26, at 78 1.
85. See Thompson, supra note 9, at 229.
86. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
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very successful.87 For example, twenty-eight-year-old Lori Michaels, the
founder of Dreamy.com, is a "self-made millionaire" from the proceeds of
her site, where users pay $9.95 per month for access.88 Other examples in-
clude Asia Carrera, a former "pornstar" who grosses approximately $3.6
million each year from her Web site, and Danni Ashe, a retired stripper,
whose site generates over five million hits every day. 89
Additionally, these Web sites combat the social problems and public
policy concerns identified with prostitution. Not only do these Web sites
eliminate the stigma of women roaming the streets selling sex, but they also
protect prostitutes from exploitation by the police.' These Web sites might
also reduce the number of children that are victims of commercial sexual ex-
ploitation. According to Richard J. Estes, Ph.D. and Neil Alan Weiner,
Ph.D., runaway teens often turn to prostitution because prostitutes already
inhabit the identical low-income areas these displaced teenagers can afford.9
The adult content Web sites enable street prostitutes to relocate their busi-
ness onto the World Wide Web in the form of interactive masturbation per-
formances, or live sex shows, thereby potentially decreasing the number of
incidents of commercial sexual exploitation of minors. 92
Moreover, the lack of physical contact dispels traditional prostitution
concerns, such as the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, rape, and the
safety of the prostitutes.93 These justifications do not extend to the world of
the Internet because of the lack of physical contact or physical proximity be-
tween the performer and his or her client. As a result of the inapplicability of
traditional justifications for prostitution regulations, public policy suggests
that the sexual performances on the World Wide Web do not qualify as pros-
titution.94
87. Russell, supra note 25.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Thompson, supra note 9, at 240 (citing Priscilla Alexander, Prostitution: A Difli-
cult Issuefor Feminists, in SEX WORK: WRrrNGs BY WOMEN IN THE SEX INDUSTRY 184, 201
(Frederique Delacoste & Priscilla Alexander eds., 1987)).
91. See Estes and Weiner, supra note 42.
92. If street prostitutes moved onto the Internet, it is highly probable that the number of
prostitutes on the street would decrease. Subsequently, it is logical to assume that a decrease
in the number of prostitutes would diminish the exposure of runaway teens to the prostitution
lifestyle.
93. See Commonwealth v. Dodge, 429 A.2d 1143, 1147, 1149 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981); and
Thompson, supra note 9, at 240 (citing Priscilla Alexander, Prostitution: A Difficult Issue for
Feminists, in SEX WORK: WRrrTNGs BY WOMEN IN THE SEX INDUSTRY 184, 201 (Frederique
Delacoste & Priscilla Alexander eds., 1987)).
94. Nahikian, supra note 26, at 803 (concluding that "the Government's traditional gov-
ernment rationales for criminalizing prostitution do not apply to cyberprostitution"). Addi-
tionally, according to a recent California Court of Appeal decision, prostitution requires
physical contact between the prostitute and the customer. Wooten v. Superior Court, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 195, 203 (Ct. App. 2001).
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Even if the Web performers' activities may constitute prostitution, sev-
eral of these actors are beyond the jurisdiction of American laws, because
these sexual acts occur in foreign countries." For example, the live sex
shows that occur on Private Media Group's Web site, Privatelive.corn, occur
in Barcelona, Spain.96 Although the actual sex act occurs outside the U.S.,
the American Web user that views or interacts with the sexual performer in
Spain still may be guilty of solicitation of prostitution.
Section 647(b) of the California Penal Code makes prostitution illegal,
and it also prohibits the "solicitation of prostitution." The act of "solicita-
tion" refers to "an offer to pay or accept money in exchange for sex."' So-
licitation, under the California prostitution statute, applies to both the cus-
tomer and the prostitute.99 Moreover, following the offer, or solicitation,
there must be some "overt act in furtherance of that agreement," which
eliminates ambiguous statements leading to false arrests.0°
For example, in Wisconsin v. Kittilstadt, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that the offering of money to foreign exchange students to have sex
with girls in front of the defendant constituted "solicitation of prostitu-
tion." ' Similar to California's solicitation statute, Wisconsin makes it a
crime if any person "has or offers to have or requests to have nonmarital
sexual intercourse for anything of value." 02 Like the scenario in Kittilstad, a
Web user's payment of a membership fee in order to view a live sex show
may constitute solicitation. Some of these Web viewers pay up to $49.95 for
a 20-minute show.103 As a result, so long as the Web performers engage in
sexual acts either before or after the Web user agrees to pay for such ser-
vices, that Web user's activities will likely violate prostitution statutes. It is
unclear whether payment of a fee to gain access to view a performance al-
ready in progress, and not at the request of the Web user, would constitute
solicitation.
95. See Cardiff, supra note 26, at 896-97 (discussing the idea that video phone dial-a-
porn actors "located in a county in Nevada where prostitution is legal" will not be prosecuted
for pornography, while the caller may actually be prosecuted under his or her state statute for
solicitation of prostitution).
96. See Morais, supra note 12.
97. CA. PENAL CoDE § 647(b) (West 1999).
98. BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 1398 (7th ed. 1999).
99. Leffel v. Municipal Court, 126 Cal. Rptr. 773, 777 (Ct. App. 1976) (holding that "all
persons, customers as well as prostitutes, who solicit an act of prostitution are guilty of disor-
derly conduct").
100. In re Cheri T., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397, 402 (Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that it does
not matter whether the act or the agreement occurs first).
101. Wisconsin v. Kittilstad, 603 N.W. 2d732, 738 (Wis. 1999).
102. Wts. STAT. ANN. § 944.30 (West 1996).
103. Russell, supra note 25.
13
Green: Sex on the Internet: A Legal Click or an Illicit Trick?
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2001
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
B. Pimping
The crime of pimping, according to the California Penal Code, prohibits
"any person, knowing another person is a prostitute, from living or deriving
support or maintenance.., in the earnings or proceeds of the person's pros-
titution. 10 4 Unlike prostitution and solicitation, which are misdemeanors,
pimping is a felony, and an offender may be incarcerated for up to six
years.10 5 As used in Section 266(h) of the California Penal Code, "prostitu-
tion" occurs when the "genitals, buttocks, or female breasts, of either the
prostitute or the customer come in contact with some part of the body of the
other for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of the customer or of
the prostitute," suggesting that physical contact is required. 6 Due to the fact
that the Web site owner receives financial support from the Web site per-
former's sexual activities, the Web site owner may be held liable for pimp-
ing, but only if the owner "knows" the performer is a "prostitute."
C. Pandering
Pandering, which is also a felony punishable by up to six years of
jailtime, is the act of "persuading or encouraging" another to become a pros-
titute. 0 7 Similar to pimping, a Web site owner may fear potential prosecu-
tion under pandering statutes. For example, if a Web site owner were to "en-
courage" a young man or women to engage in sexual acts constituting
prostitution, then that Web site owner may be criminally liable under
pandering statutes.
In Freeman, where a pornographic movie producer hired actors to en-
gage in nonobscene sexual activities for a film,'08 the movie producer faced
pandering charges.'0 9 In order to prosecute an individual for pandering, the
prosecutor must initially prove the occurrence of acts of prostitution."0 Be-
cause Section 266(i) fails to define "prostitution," the court, in Freeman,
looked to the State's prostitution statute, Section 647(b), in order to ascertain
104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 266(h) (West 1999). See People v. Maita, 203 Cal. Rptr. 685,
688 (Cal Ct. App. 1984) (upholding pimping and pandering convictions of a club owner
where the owner permitted and encouraged performers to "have sexual relations with the au-
dience").
105. CAL. PENAL CODE § 266(h) (West 1999).
106. People v. Hill, 163 Cal. Rptr. 99, 105 (Ct. App. 1980).
107. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 266(i) (West 1999).
108. People v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128, 1129 (Cal. 1988). Obscenity is not required for a
prostitution conviction. State v. Taylor, 808 P.2d 314, 319 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). Obscene
acts, however, are punishable under a different statute. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (West
1999).
109. Freeman, 758 P.2d at 1129.
110. CAL. PENAL CODE § 266(i) (West 1999). Pandering, a felony, is much more serious
of a crime than prostitution, only a misdemeanor, as evidenced by its much lengthier jailtime.
Id.
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whether the compensated sexual activities constituted prostitution.", Due to
the fact that paying actors to perform nonobscene sexual acts on film did not
qualify as prostitution, the movie producer did not "engage in... the requi-
site conduct" for a pandering violation." 2
D. Related Prostitution Crimes
Other prostitution-related offenses in California include placing or per-
mitting placement of wife in a house of prostitution," 3 keeping or residing in
a house used for prostitution," 4 and leasing an apartment with the knowl-
edge that it will be used for prostitution."' According to Section 266(g) of
the California Penal Code, any husband that "places or leaves" his wife at a
"house of prostitution," ... or "permits" his wife to "remain" in a "house of
prostitution" is "guilty of a felony," subject to three to four years of prison-
time.116 As a result, if the location of Webcasted sexual activities constitutes
a "house of prostitution,""' 7 then a husband that "knowingly"" s allows his
wife to "stay" there is criminally liable. Although Section 266(g) can still be
found in the California Penal Code, its archaic nature has limited its use in
recent times.
Under Section 315 of the California Penal Code, it is a misdemeanor to
"keep" or "willfully reside" in a house used for prostitution." 9 As a result of
this criminal statute, a person that maintains a facility with the knowledge
that it will be used for the Webcasting of sexual activities constituting prosti-
tution is in violation of this statute. In addition, the leasing of property with
the knowledge that it will be used for prostitution is a misdemeanor." -t Con-
sequently, the lessor of any commercial or residential space with the knowl-
edge that it is used for "cyberprostitution"'' - is potentially guilty of a crime.
Pimping, pandering, prostitution and solicitation of prostitution statutes
could be used to impose liability only upon the Web user, the Web site
owner, and the Web performers. However, these other related statutes could
111. Freeman, 758 P.2dat 1130.
112. Id. at 1131. The payment made to the actors did not constitute prostitution because
the provided consideration was not "for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, his own
or the actors'." Id.
113. CAL. PENALCODE§ 266(g) (West 1999).
114. CAL. PENALCODE § 315 (West 1999).
115. CAL. PENALCODE§ 316 (West 1999).
116. CAL. PENALCODE§ 266(g) (West 1999).
117. See People v. Head, 304 P.2d 761, 764 (Ct. App. 1956) (defining a "house of prosti-
tution" as any location where a "prostitute plies her trade").
118. See id at 766 (upholding a jury instruction allowing an acquittal if the husband is
"without knowledge" that acts of prostitution occur at a "house of prostitution").
119. CAL. PENALCODE§ 315 (West 1999).
120. CAL. PENALCODE § 316 (West 1999).
121. Nahikian, supra note 26, at 781.
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also extend the reach of law enforcement to hold husbands of the Web per-
formers, the property owners, and property lessors criminally liable as well.
Another Internet activity subject to potential prosecution as prostitution
is the sale of women from Eastern Europe and Asia. 2 2 The Internet provides
a forum for companies that provide "mail-order brides" and "sex tours" to
market their service to potential customers. 13 These services include trips to
the Caribbean and the Far East for the purpose of engaging in sexual activi-
ties with young, foreign girls.'24 Through such Web sites, the customer can
select a specific girl from a gallery of pictures depicting various girls per-
forming sexual acts."2 Such services could be construed as utilizing the
Internet for the purpose of prostitution. However, because the actual sexual
act occurs outside the U.S. borders, the customer potentially may only be li-
able for solicitation of prostitution.' 26
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
In analyzing whether certain sexual activities on adult Web sites charg-
ing a fee constitute prostitution, it is necessary to address whether the First
Amendment protects such activities. It is well established that the First
Amendment does not protect "obscene" content or behavior.2 7 In Miller, the
Court laid out a three-prong test for determining obscenity. 28 A work is ob-
scene if the "average person applying contemporary community standards
would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest," "the
work" is "patently offensive," and "the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.' 2t 9 Any material that encom-
passes all three of the elements is not protected by the First Amendment and
will violate state obscenity laws.' 30
California defines "obscene" to be any matter that depicts "a shameful
or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion" with no "redeeming social
importance."' 3' The First Amendment, however, shields viewing "obscene
122. Emily Rose, Focus on Cyberporn; Bride Buying, Sex Services Fueling Calls for
Laws, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL AND CONSTITUTION, Nov. 28, 1995, at 20A.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Cardiff, supra note 26, at 896-97 (identifying the notion that only one party
may be susceptible to criminal prosecution under his or her state statute for solicitation of
prostitution).
127. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957); and Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
128. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
129. Id.
130. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2(a) (West 1999) (making it a misdemeanor to "know-
ingly distribute obscene matter" and held constitutional in Miller).
131. CAL. PENALCODE § 311 (West 1999).
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matter" in one's own residence. 32 Moreover, although "obscene" material is
not protected as free speech, the First Amendment safeguards "indecent sex-
ual expression."'
133
Due to the fact that most pornographic films, "taken as a whole," con-
tain at least some minimal plotline, adult movies possess some "artistic
value."' 34 As a result, the First Amendment usually shields pornographic
movies. "Isolated shots of highly sexual materials... seen as a reduction of
focus to the sex act itself," which are not "part of any story," like brief clips
offered on several adult Web sites, however, lose their "artistic value."'
35
Many of the live sex services fall in between the full-length films and the ac-
tual sex scene. So long as the live sex performance maintains some artistic
value, such as including a storyline for the audience, these services are less
likely to be found obscene. Although the First Amendment protects nonob-
scene speech, proof of obscenity is not required for a prostitution convic-
tion.1 36
It is well established that "live theatrical performances" are protected by
the First Amendment. 37 In order to analyze whether regulations that restrict
"conduct" containing both "speech" and "nonspeech" elements, such as
prostitution statutes, do not violate the First Amendment, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in O'Brien, implemented four factors to take into consideration:
(1) whether the regulation is within the constitutional power of the gov-
ernment, (2) whether the governmental interest is important or substantial,
(3) whether the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression, and (4) whether the incidental restrictions on allegd First
Amendment interests is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
the interest
138
132. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) (although the home has a pro-
tected privacy interest, one can still be convicted under obscenity statutes for purchasing the
obscene material).
133. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
134. Blake T. Bilstad, Obscenity and Indecency in a Digital Age: The Legal and Political
Implications of Cybersmut, Virtual Pornography, and the Communications Decency Act of
1996, 13 SANTA CLARA CoMP Nma & HIGH TEaCH. LJ. 321, 370 (citing LANcE ROSE,
NarLAw: YouR RIGHTS nI' THE ONLINE WORLD 257-58 (1995)), who stated that most courts
would not "conclude that a video taken as a whole, lacks serious artistic value").
135. Id. (quoting LANCE ROSE, NETLAw: YOUR RIGHTS IN THE ONLINE WORLD 258
(1995)).
136. State v. Taylor, 808 P.2d 314, 319 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
137. See Barrows v. Municipal Court, 464 P.2d 483, 487, 489 (Cal. 1970) (holding that
the application of CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(a), which makes it a crime to "solicit anyone to
engage in or who engages in lewd or dissolute conduct in any public place or in any place
open to the public exposed to public view," did not apply to the producer and director of a
live stage play containing sexual conduct because it "would have an inhibiting effect upon the
exercise of First Amendment rights").
138. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The regulation of "content" by
itself demands "strict scrutiny" analysis. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642
(1994) (holding that the strict scrutiny standard must be applied to any "regulations that sup-
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In Freeman, the court applied the O'Brien factors in its discussion of
pandering charges against the producer and director of a commercial film
containing hired actors engaging in sexual activities.1 39 The court assumed
that the statute was within the Legislature's constitutional power and deemed
the governmental interests of preventing profiteering from prostitution and
curtailing the spread of AIDS and other STDs to be "important.' 40 Under
the third factor, however, the "punishment of a motion picture producer for
the making of a nonobscene film" had virtually nothing to do with "the pur-
pose of combating prostitution. '"141
The court held that the prosecutor was merely using the pandering stat-
ute to "prevent profiteering in pornography," not prostitution. 42 Moreover,
because the prosecution acknowledged that no prostitution would have oc-
curred had the actors not been paid, the "public health" interest was also "not
credible.' 43 Additionally, regarding the fourth factor, the court recognized
that identifying paid actors in a "nonobscene motion picture" as "prostitutes"
would have a widespread "sweeping" effect upon all films, including "films
of unquestioned artistic and social merit, as well as films made for medical
or educational purposes."'"
While the First Amendment protects nonobscene films,'45 live "theatri-
cal performances" that involve sexual contact between either the consumer
and the performer 146 or multiple performers 47 do not qualify as protected
speech. In Taylor, while analyzing prostitution charges against performers
engaging in "sexual contact" in plain view of paying strip club patrons, the
Arizona Supreme Court applied the O'Brien factors.'48 Similar to Freeman,
the court identified the State's power to regulate prostitution, 49 as well as
the State's substantial interests in regulating prostitution. 50 Unlike Freeman,
press, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content").
Every piece of legislation must protect a "narrowly-tailored" compelling government interest,
such that there are no less-restrictive alternatives. See generally Reno v. ACLU (Reno II), 521
U.S. 844 (1997).
139. People v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128, 1132 (Cal. 1988).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. See People v. Maita, 203 Cal. Rptr. 685, 688 (Cal Ct. App. 1984).
147. State v. Taylor, 808 P.2d 314, 319 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
148. Id. at 317. The court pointed to the fact that, when particular conduct contains both
"speech" and "nonspeech" components, a "sufficiently important governmental interest" sup-
porting the "nonspeech" component may "justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
149. Taylor, 808 P.2d at 317 (citing State v. Green, 131 P.2d 411, 412 (Ariz. 1942) rec-
ognizing that prostitution is "an evil over which the legislature has almost plenary power").
150. Id. The State's rationales for regulating prostitution included "preventing communi-
cable disease, preventing sexual exploitation, and reducing the assorted criminal misconduct
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the court held that the State's "public health" concerns were legitimate and
were "wholly unrelated to suppressing free expression."''5
Regarding the fourth element, the court held that the "incidental im-
pingement on First Amendment freedoms" is not "greater than essential to
further the governmental interests at stake,"'52 and rejected the argument that
"protected theatrical expression will suffer if the state prosecutes erotic per-
formance as prostitution."'5 3 Although this argument was persuasive in
Freeman, Taylor was distinguishable because the paid performers in the
booths were not "separated from consumers by time and the distancing me-
dium of film."' The court, as a result, concluded that Taylor parallels Maita
because of "the presence of the consumer,"'' 55 and held that the conviction of
the booth performers was proper under the O'Brien analysis.' 56
Because Web performers are giving live, "semi-private"'I57 presentations
like those in Taylor, California courts could potentially convict Web per-
formers that receive compensation to engage in sexual activity in order to
fulfill a Web users' voyeuristic desires of prostitution. 5 In Taylor, however,
which relied upon Maita, the customer was within close physical proximity
to the prostitutes.'59 To the contrary, the cyberspace consumer is not physi-
cally present where the sexual acts occur.
Moreover, like the films in Freeman, the customer is viewing the sexual
acts through the lens of a Web camera. Additionally, the Internet's lack of
physical contact dispels several public health prostitution concerns, includ-
ing the spread of STDs, rape, and the safety of the prostitutes."6 The strong
resemblance to Freeman, coupled with the elimination of traditional public
that tends to cluster with prostitution." Id.
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policy concerns, indicates that the sexual performances on the World Wide
Web do not qualify as prostitution, and should be immune from prosecution.
CONCLUSION
It remains undecided by the courts whether a person that provides con-
sideration to gain access to an adult Web site and subsequently views a live-
sex show, or directs an Internet performer to masturbate, is engaging in
criminal behavior. Because the lack of physical contact is inherent in Inter-
net communications, the scenario of a Web user paying a fee to direct a "cy-
berprostitute"'1 61 to masturbate does not constitute an act of prostitution. 62
Similarly, the strong resemblance of communication mediums between the
Internet and motion pictures, such that the Web consumer is not physically
present where the sexual acts occur and views the sexual performance
through the lens of a Web camera, coupled with the elimination of traditional
public policy concerns, such as the spread of STDs, rape, and the safety of
the prostitutes, 63 indicates that the performance of live sexual acts of per-
formers via the World Wide Web does not qualify as prostitution. Hence, pa-
ternalistic attempts to utilize prostitution statutes to curb sexual activities on
the Internet should be thwarted. Consequently, the live video streaming of
sex will remain "the hottest ticket item among the pornicopia of online prod-
ucts available."' 64
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